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STRIKES AND PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 
Theodore W. Kheel* 
ONE of the major unmet challenges we face is how to prevent strikes by public employees without denying them the right 
to organize and bargain collectively. Public employment grows in 
significance each day as governments at every level undertake new 
programs to supply additional services for the public good. Across 
the nation there are some twelve million public workers, twice the 
number there were in 1950.1 More than 8.5 million of these public 
employees work for state and local government;2 it is anticipated 
that their number will grow by two thirds in the next decade. Of 
2.8 million federal workers, more than one million are union mem-
bers.3 It is estimated that ninety-nine per cent of American cities 
with a population over 250,000 have unions or employee associations 
representing public workers. Labor Depattment statistics for 1969 
showed 629,000 state and local employees in AFL-CIO affiliates, and 
independent teachers' organizations report membership of 1,168,-
000.4 The fastest growing labor organization in the country is the 
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, 
AFL-CIO.15 
This tendency of public employees to organize has been aided by 
legislation facilitating union recognition and imposing obligations 
on public employers to negotiate with employee representatives.6 
The spread of organization among public employees is also a reflec-
tion of a more general tendency in our society to form groups in 
order to augment the force of individual demands by concerted ac-
tion. Students, black Americans, football players, tenants, and wel-
fare recipients, among others, have joined together in pursuit of 
shared aims. Organization quite naturally produces greater demands 
• Member of the New York Bar. A.B. 1935, LL.B. 1937, Cornell University.-Ed. 
1. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STA· 
TISTICS 1968, at 80, table 41 (1968). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. at 296, table 126. 
4. Id. 
5. Ross, Those Newly Militant Government Workers, FORTUNE, Aug. 1968, at 104. 
6. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153(d) (Supp. 1969); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. 
§ 423.209 (1967); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:13A-l to -13 (Supp. 1968); N.Y. CIV. SERv. I.Aw 
§§ 200-12, (McKinney Supp. 1968) [The present version of this law, as amended by a 
bill passed March 4, 1969 (effective April I, 1969), appears in GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE 
RELATIONS REPORT, No. 288, at F-1 (March 17, 1969).]; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(2) 
(Supp. 1969). See Report of the Governor's Commission To Revise the Public Employer 
Law of Pennsylvania (June 1968). 
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and often some form of action to support those demands. This, too, 
is not unique to labor organizations. Politicians and commentators 
speak of a new militancy and point to more strident demands and 
direct action by all sorts of groups. 
In public employment there has been an increasing resort to 
strikes in all parts of the nation by employees previously immune-
teachers, policemen, firemen, welfare workers, garbage collectors, 
hospital attendants, doctors, nurses, and zoo keepers. The strike 
fever is contagious, and leapfrogging demands and multiplying dis-
putes leave government hesitant, defensive, and distracted from the 
unresolved problems of our urban crisis. The basic question-and 
the great challenge-is how to prevent strikes that imperil the pub-
lic interest while still providing millions of public employees with 
the opportunity to participate in the process of determining the con-
ditions of their work, an opportunity not only guaranteed employees 
in the private sector but also accepted as socially beneficial. 
The common answer to this question in public employment was 
to prohibit all strikes by statute or court decision7 and to prescribe 
penalties in the form of fines or imprisonment, or both, for violation 
of these prohibitions. Employees were allowed to negotiate with 
their employers through unions, but they were required to accept 
as final the decision of the legislative or executive body with au-
thority to set terms of employment. Any further change had to be 
sought by lobbying or through the polls. 
This was the pattern in New York under the Condon-Wadlin 
Law.8 It was not successful. The legal prohibition of strikes did not 
prevent workers from threatening disruptions of service and, on 
occasion, from carrying out the threat. The penalties assessed against 
individual workers did not deter them from concerted action.9 After 
a twelve-day transit strike in 1966 that nearly brought New York 
City to a complete standstill,10 the need for change was apparent. 
7. See Annot., Union Organization and Activities of Public Employees, 31 A.L.R.2d 
1142, 1159-61 (1953). For a more recent view, see School Dist. v. Holland Educ. Assn., 
380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W.2d 206 (1968). See also Smith, State and Local Advisory Reports 
on Public Employment Labor Legislation: A. Comparative Analysis, 67 MICH. L. REv. 
891, 892, 898 (1969) 
8. Law of March 27, 1947, ch. 391, [1947] N.Y. Laws 842, as amended, Law of April 
23, 1963, ch. 702, [1963] N.Y. Laws 2432 (repealed 1967). 
9. Under the provisions of this act, the striking employee was subject to im• 
mediate dismissal. The employee could be reinstated only on condition that he remain 
on probation for five years and his compensation was to remain fixed for a period of 
three years. However, these sanctions were found to be largely unenforceable and, 
thus, were seldom invoked. 
10. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1966, at 1. 
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Not only had the law failed to stop the strike, but it threatened to 
produce a second work stoppage because of the penalty provisions. 
The enforcement of these provisions would have denied the transit 
workers the higher wages and other benefits negotiated under the 
mayor's auspices. As a result, the governor and the legislature con-
cluded that there was no alternative but to waive the penalties 
despite the clear violations of the statue. The law was in disrepute. 
Governor Rockefeller convened a special committee headed by Dr. 
George W. Taylor, one of America's greatest authorities on indus-
trial relations. The report of this committee was substantially in-
corporated in a piece of new legislation, although with one important 
qualification which will be discussed below. The Taylor Law con-
tinued the absolute prohibition on strikes by public employees,11 
while shifting penalties so that they would be directed primarily 
against the employee organization rather than the individual 
worker.12 In addition, it assured rights of organization, imposed an 
obligation on public employees to meet and confer with employer 
representatives, and established an elaborate machinery of third-
party recommendations to aid the parties in the "collective negotia-
tions"13 that were expected to produce agreements. 
The penalties flowed necessarily from the strike ban. Once a form 
of conduct is made illegal, a system of penalties for violations must 
also be prescribed. In the case of unions, this is not without its diffi-
culties. Who is to blame when a strike occurs? Is it the leaders of 
the union, the union itself, or the members who actually strike? Con-
don-Wadlin implied that it was the strikers, since it prohibited them 
from receiving wage increases for a specified period of time.14 The 
Taylor Law shifted the burden to the union and its leaders, un-
doubtedly because of the widespread belief that during the transit 
11. The Taylor Law is incorporated in N.Y. CIV. SERv. LAw §§ 200-12 (McKinney 
Supp. 1968). [The present version of this law, as amended by a bill passed on March 
4, 1969 (effective April 1, 1969), appears in GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT, 
No. 288, at F-1 (March 17, 1969).] The strike prohibition is contained in section 200. 
12. The New York Legislature amended the Taylor Law on March 4, 1969, to 
provide for stiffer penalties against striking public employers and their unions. The 
amendments call for unlimited fines against striking unions and the loss of dues 
check-off privileges for unlimited periods. Another section provides for the loss of two 
days' pay for each day a public employee is on strike. Moreover, a striking worker is 
subject to one year's prohibition with loss of tenure for any violation of the strike 
prohibition. For the text of the law as amended, see GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RELATIONS 
REPORT, No. 288, at F-1 (March 17, 1969) (hereinafter GERR]. 
I!!. The Taylor Law uses the term "collective negotiations" instead of "collective 
bargaining," because the latter phrase implies the possibility of a strike. And, accord-
ing to the Taylor Law, strikes are illegal. 
14. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 104(5)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1968). 
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strike the union's leadership had induced the workers to strike. But 
the current wave of rank-and-file rejections of negotiated settle-
ments15 casts a serious doubt on the validity of this underlying as-
sumption in the penalty provisions of the Taylor Law. 
In addition to a schedule of penalties, a law granting public em-
ployees the right to negotiate must also contain a strike substitute 
to resolve any impasse in negotiations. The Taylor Law calls for 
the appointment of a board to make recommendations for a settle-
. ment.16 But recommendations by definition can be rejected. The 
framers of the Taylor Law apparently assumed that the unions would 
be the only ones to reject recommendations and that the pressure of 
public opinion would eventually induce them to accept the findings 
of a distinguished panel. But experience has proven that public 
agencies also reject recommendations and that neither employers 
nor employees are forced to agreement by critical editorials or public 
dismay. In the famous sanitation strike in February of 1968, Mayor 
Lindsay rejected as "blackmail" a panel's recommendation for an 
additional increase of fifty cents a week and was widely praised for 
this action. The fact is that either side can reject recommendations 
with impunity, leaving open the question of how the dispute is then 
to be settled. It is also true that when recommendations are rejected 
by one side and accepted by the other, the dispute usually becomes 
more difficult to settle. Positions become frozen, and the likelihood 
of a serious impasse is increased. In the absence of any further pro-
cedures, the status quo prevails, usually to the union's disadvantage, 
thus deepening the belief of labor organizations that the law is unfair 
to them. In the traditional dispute over a wage increase, a union 
objecting to the amount recommended is effectively without re-
course, since it cannot strike. The result is the same where the union 
accepts but the public employer rejects. To avoid such a situation, 
unions are led to threaten a strike during negotiations in an effort 
to solidify their bargaining position. It is doubtful that such threats 
can be made illegal. In one instance, a union seeking to discount the 
prospect of a strike nevertheless conveyed a threat when its president 
answered affirmatively a reporter's question as to whether the union 
intended to adhere to its traditional policy of no contract, no work. 
This was a strike threat, but hardly grounds for a criminal pro-
ceeding. 
15. This has occurred both in the recent strike by New York City sanitation work-
ers in February 1968 and the November 1968 strike involving Consolidated Edison 
employees. 
16. N.Y. Crv. SERv. LAW § 209 (McKinney Supp. 1968). 
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Where no agreement is reached by the deadline, it becomes diffi-
cult if not impossible for the union leader to avoid going over the 
brink. Alternatively, the unions may resort to subterfuge methods 
of achieving an effective bargaining posture by working to the rule, 
feigning sickness, or even by engaging in a mass resignation. Perhaps 
the most ingenious technique was the decision of a police group to 
punish all traffic violators for even minor infractions. This effectively 
reduced automobile accidents, but it also slowed traffic and dis-
tracted police officers from other more pressing assignments. 
The Taylor Committee foresaw the difficulties arising when rec-
ommendations are rejected and proposed that such impasses be sub-
mitted to the appropriate legislative body for a final determination.17 
But the New York State Legislature did not view favorably the pros-
pect of having each labor dispute that reached an impasse submitted 
to it for decision. Moreover, it is questionable whether the legislature 
is an appropriate body to handle individual labor disputes. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the legislature dropped this proposal. As 
a result, there was no means by which a dispute involving public em-
ployees in the State of New York could be resolved if the parties 
themselves failed to agree. In two subsequent reports to Governor 
Rockefeller, the Taylor Committee identified this lack of finality as 
a major defect in the law, but it offered no new solution.18 Rather, 
the Committee reaffirmed its proposal for legislative determination 
to resolve impasses created when either party rejects recommenda-
tions. In its recent amendments to the Taylor Law, the New York 
Legislature apparently accepted this proposal.19 
The Taylor Law has now been in effect for nearly two years. 
It was subjected to great strain in its infancy. Not yet an adult chro-
nologically, it has aged rapidly in experience and is now seasoned 
enough to be judged. It has not met the harsh but significant test 
17. Governor's Committee on Public Employee Relations, State of New York, Final 
Report 56-57 (1966). 
18. Governor's Committee on Public Employee Relations, State of New York, 
Interim Report Gune 17, 1968). 
19. Under the amended law, final resolution of disputes is committed to the appro-
priate legislative body: 
(iii) [T]he legislative body or a duly authorized committee thereof shall forthwith 
conduct a hearing at which the parties shall be required to explain their positions 
with respect to the report of the fact-finding board; and (iv) thereafter, the legis-
lative body shall take such action as it deems to be in the public interest, includ-
ing the interest of the public employees involved. 
Law of March 4, 1969, § 209(3)(e), GERR, No. 288, F-1, F-5, amending N.Y. C1v. SERv. 
LAW § 209(3)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1968). 
For the proposal of the Taylor Committee, see Governor's Committee on Public 
Employee Relations, State of New York, Second Interim Report 5 Gan. 23, 1969). 
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by which such machinery must be evaluated: it has not prevented 
strikes that imperil the public interest. In September 1967, the 
teachers in New York City struck for fourteen days.20 In the early 
hours of 1968 a transit strike was narrowly averted after negotiations 
under an implicit strike threat; in order to achieve settlement, the 
procedures of the Taylor Act had to be temporarily set aside.21 In 
February 1968, the sanitation service of New York City was inter-
rupted for nine days, leaving the city unsightly, unkempt, infested 
with disease, plagued by the threat of fire, and seemingly helpless 
to correct the situation. And in the fall of 1968 the city's schools 
were closed for two months in a dispute that set new marks for bit-
terness and hostility, and raised spectres of racial and religious bias 
that threaten to undermine the fabric of social order.22 Other im-
portant city workers, including policemen and firemen, have either 
threatened strikes or resorted to some form of job action. 
It would be unfair to place upon the legal machinery sole re-
sponsibility for these interruptions of critical services on which the 
welfare of New York depends. But the fact remains that the ma-
chinery-including the prohibition on strikes with attendant penal-
ties and the fact-finding boards with their power to make recom-
mendations-did not work to settle these disputes or stop the strikes, 
slowdowns, or threats. In fact it is probable that the Taylor Law 
exacerbated these conflicts. For one thing, it made subversive a form 
of conduct society endorses for private workers. It encouraged unions 
to threaten to strike to achieve the bargaining position participants 
in collective bargaining must possess. It made the march to jail a 
martyr's procession and a badge of honor for union leaders. It har-
dened positions by calling upon representative organizations to de-
clare publicly their acceptance or rejection of fact finders' recom-
mendations. In simple point of fact, it did not and is not likely to 
work as a mechanism for resolving conflicts in public employment 
relations through joint determination, whether called collective bar-
gaining or collective negotiations. 
Now there is raised with increasing frequency the suggestion that 
the proper technique for resolution of impasses in public employ-
ment relations is some third-party determination where an outsider 
to the dispute is given ultimate authority to fix the terms of employ-
20. N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1967, at 1, col. 8. 
21. N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1968, at 1, col. 3; id., Jan. 2, 1968, at 1, col. 2. 
22. Mayer, The Full and Sometimes Very Surprising Story of Ocean Hill, the 
Teachers' Union and the Teachers' Strikes of 1968, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1969, § 6 
(Magazine), at 18. 
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ment. Most commonly this takes the form of a proposal for compul-
sory arbitration, but other procedures such as labor courts are also 
mentioned.23 The Taylor Committee rejected compulsory arbitra-
tion for two reasons.24 First, the Committee thought that it was 
probably an illegal delegation of the authority of a public agency. 
Second, it felt that it would encourage disputants to resort constantly 
to arbitration instead of themselves assuming the responsibility of 
decision-making. But proposals for arbitration persist. Moreover, 
they do succeed in framing the issue properly, for the question seems 
to me to be whether there is a viable alternative to collective bar-
gaining for the effective resolution of disputes in public employment, 
and compulsory arbitration in one form or another is the only 
logical, if not practical, alternative. It does provide, at least in theory, 
for a "final" resolution of conflicts when an impasse is reached. 
My concern here is with the proposals that arbitration should 
become the common technique for settlement of disputes over the 
terms of a new contract25-including issues of wages, other benefits, 
and working conditions. This is not a precisely defined area. In-
creasingly the issues in dispute include questions of employee par-
ticipation in determination of policy in the work place. This is 
particularly true in highly skilled and professional categories. 
Teachers, doctors, social workers-all naturally seek a greater voice 
in the professional decisions affecting their work.26 
There are in effect only three ways by which the terms of employ-
ment can be set in the public or private sector. First, they may be set 
unilaterally, commonly by the employer. In private industry this is 
still the case where the employees are not organized, but it is illegal 
23. See generally Fleming, The Labor Court Idea, 65 MICH. L. REv. 1551 (1967). 
24. Governor's Committee, supra note 17, at 67-68. 
25. Disputes over the terms of a new contract should be clearly distinguished from 
questions of "interpretation" or "application" of contracts already in force. In the 
private sector, individual questions of interpretation or application are commonly 
resolved through grievance procedures leading to voluntary arbitration. The inclusion 
of these procedures in negotiated agreements is one of the great achievements of labor-
management relations in this country, for it assures the stability necessary for 
economic planning and growth during the period of a contract. This practice stands 
in marked contrast to that of other countries, such as England, where the threat of 
wildcat or unofficial strikes is a constant impediment to economic growth and in-
dustrial efficiency. In the public sector, where contracts of employment are permitted 
and where obstacles to arbitration of grievances have largely been overcome, the 
union is generally able to obtain agreement from the public employer to arbitrate 
questions of interpretation or application during the period of the contract. 
26. See generally Klaus, The Evolution of a Collective Bargaining Relationship in 
Public Education: New York City's Changing Seven-Year History, 67 MICH. L. REv. 
1033 (1969); Wallett, The Coming Revolution in Public School Management, 67 MICH. 
L. REv. 1017 (1969). 
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where unions have been chosen. Although modified by available 
political appeals, this was the traditional method used in public em-
ployment for organized as well as unorganized workers. Second, the 
. terms of employment may be set by joint determination through 
collective bargaining. Joint talks can supply information and help 
define the area of disagreement, but real bargaining to resolve those 
issues depends on the ability of the negotiators effectively to say 
"no" by suspending the relationship. That possibility exerts pressure 
on both sides. It infuses the bargaining with the sense of urgency 
that produces necessary accommodation of conflicting interests. 
Third, a neutral third party may be designated the final decision 
maker. This is the case in arbitration. The impartial adjudicator 
hears both sides and makes a decision. Arbitration should not be con-
fused with fact-finding, mediation, or any other form of third-party 
procedure that does not result in a final decision. In arbitration, the 
standard of determination can and should be the equity of the claim, 
whereas in fact-finding with recommendations, the standard has to 
be the acceptability of the recommendations. The arbitrator's deci-
sion is final. Since there is no appeal from the decision, the un-
certainty may encourage voluntary agreement. Each party runs a 
risk, so there may in fact be more incentive to agree than is the case 
when a board makes recommendations which can be turned down. 
But it also provides, as the Taylor Committee observed,27 an incen-
tive for negotiators to pass the buck and then complain about the 
result. 
Several states have adopted statutes imposing arbitration in par-
ticular types of public employment disputes. In Minnesota, disputes 
over "maximum hours and minimum wages" of employees in chari-
table non profit hospitals must be submitted to arbitration.28 A 
Nebraska statute governing public employee labor disputes provides 
for arbitration at the request of either party.29 In Rhode Island two 
statutes provide for arbitration of disputes involving teachers and 
municipal employees, but the decision is binding only with respect 
to matters not involving monetary expenditures.80 Under a recent 
Pennsylvania statute,31 unresolved disputes involving uniformed 
police and firemen must be arbitrated. In other disputes not im-
periling public health or safety, a strike may lawfully take place. 
27. Governor's Committee, supra note 17, at 67-68. 
28. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.36-.38 (1966). 
29. NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-824 (1968). 
30. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 28-9.3-9, 28-9.4-10 (1969). 
31. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217 (Supp. 1969). 
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This is a major departure from traditional thought about strikes by 
public employees. 
While arbitration can be a legal and feasible method of settling 
disputes in certain situations, it is not in my opinion the panacea 
for our problems. It does face serious legal obstacles. There are many 
issues which are proper subjects of bargaining, but which no agency 
of government can legally submit for decision to a third party. This 
is evident, for example, in disputes involving teachers whose work 
is directly affected by educational policy which school boards must 
ultimately decide. Arbitration will be effective only if viewed as a 
last resort after other steps have failed and the dispute has reached 
a stage where the issues remaining unresolved have been sharply 
narrowed and can be stated within specific bounds. Framing the 
issues properly, and providing some standards for determination-if 
only the limits of the arbitrator's authority-is essential if arbitra-
tion is to be of any use. The absence of standards of reference makes 
arbitration of issues involving wages and other terms of a contract 
fraught with difficulty. In the case of policy questions, arbitration 
must be viewed as illegal and impractical except within narrowly 
defined limits. When bargaining has framed the issue with precision, 
then arbitration may be possible. Thus Congress first framed the 
issue and then ordered arbitration in the national railroad dispute 
of 1967. The question submitted was whether a proposal made by a 
fact-finding panel should be modified.32 The burden was on the par-
ties seeking a change to prove why it should be granted, and stan-
dards for such a determination were included in the special legisla-
tion. In these circumstances, the board of arbitration was able to 
function because the outer limits of the award were effectively pre-
scribed by the law imposing arbitration. 
Other difficulties involved in using arbitration as the common 
method of dispute settlement in situations where the issues are sub-
mitted without definition were revealed in my experience during a 
police dispute as the first arbitrator appointed under the 1968 statute 
in Pennsylvania.83 The dispute concerned the demand of police in 
Pittsburgh for wage increases and other benefits, and the demand of 
the city for a change in the disciplinary procedures for police which 
the state legislature had set. The police and the city divided sharply 
on two related questions concerning interpretation of the arbitration 
statute. The first was whether the arbitration board should consider 
32. 45 U.S.C. § 157 (Supp. 1968). 
33. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217 (Supp. 1969). 
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the fiscal requirements of the city in making its decision and limit 
the award to the existing revenue and taxing authority of the mu-
nicipality. 84 The statute was silent. The police argued that the stan-
dard of determination should be "what is a policeman worth in 
today's society." The city argued that the arbitrator should be guided 
by the fiscal responsibilities and limitations of the deficit-ridden 
municipal government. Without any guidelines, the arbitrator's 
award could well have been grossly inadequate by comparison with 
the policemen's legitimate needs, or it might have been grossly out 
of line with the city's fiscal capacity. 
The second question was the extent to which the statute imposed 
an obligation on the state legislature to take action required to 
effectuate the arbitrators' award. Here, the positions of the parties 
seemed to reverse. The union argued that the arbitrators could not 
compel a change in the law. The city said the state legislature was 
bound by the decision and would have to enact whatever legislation 
was necessary to effectuate the award. The statute was ambiguous. 
But if it is read to grant the arbitrators authority to "bind" the legis-
lature, the act might well be unconstitutional. On the other hand, if 
the legislature has no obligation to provide the necessary funds, the 
city could be crippled by an award with which it is bound to 
comply. It would be forced either to impose taxes it opposes or to 
cut other services not covered by the award. If the legislature does 
not have to change the law on disciplinary procedures to comply 
with an arbitration award, then the demand for a change is not 
arbitrable in spite of what the law says. Either way it is an intolerable 
dilemma. I declined the opportunity to resolve this question, which 
properly belongs to the courts, but in issuing my award on wages 
I made clear my feeling that the legislature had some obligation-
albeit not necessarily legal or enforceable-to provide the city the 
resources it needed to comply with the award without reducing 
essential services. But the more fundamental issues remained un-
settled, and remain today the subject of debate throughout Penn-
sylvania. The simple lesson is that compulsory arbitration for all 
disputes and all issues is neither legally sound nor practically fea-
sible. It would be a great mistake to adopt this procedure as the 
usual method prescribed in advance for all disputes in the expecta-
tion that it would signal an end to labor strife in public employment. 
I believe, rather, that we should acknowledge the failure of 
34. See generally Rehmus, Constraints on Local Governments and Public Employee 
Bargaining, 67 MICH. L. REv. 919 (1969). 
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unilateral determination, and turn instead to true collective bar-
gaining, even though this must include the possibility of a strike. 
vVe would then clearly understand that we must seek to improve the 
bargaining process and the skill of the negotiators to prevent strikes. 
For in the end, the solution to the wide range of labor problems in-
volving the many aspects of a dynamic and complicated human rela-
tionship must depend on the human factor. The most elaborate 
machinery is no better than the people who man it. It cannot func-
tion automatically. With skillful and responsible negotiators, no 
machinery, no outsiders, and no fixed rules are needed to settle dis-
putes. For too long our attention has been directed to the mechanics 
and penalties rather than to the participants and the process. It is 
now time to change that, to seek to prevent strikes by encouraging 
collective bargaining to the fullest extent possible. 
For the few strikes that might jeopardize public health or safety, 
I would favor legislation authorizing the governor of a state to seek 
an injunction for a specified period through procedures similar to 
those for emergency disputes under the Taft-Hartley Act.35 During 
the cooling-off period, the parties could continue their search for 
the basis of accommodation to end the dispute. If these procedures 
prove unavailing, then the legislature could consider means, but not 
the specific terms, of settlement, including the possibility of sub-
mitting the remaining issues to arbitration within specified bounds. 
In a particular situation, with issues sharply limited and defined 
through bargaining, arbitration imposed as a last resort by the legis-
lature can effectively protect the public interest without making a 
sham of the bargaining process. Our primary reliance would then 
be placed, as I believe it must if we are to prevent strikes, on joint 
determination by parties in a true bargaining atmosphere. 
I suggest, in short, that there is no workable substitute for col-
lective bargaining-even in government-and that our best chance 
to prevent strikes against the public interest lies in improving the 
practice of bargaining. In an environment conducive to real bar-
gaining, strikes will be fewer and shorter than in a system where em-
ployees are in effect invited to defy the law in order to make real the 
promise of joint determination. In a real bargaining environment, 
the employee representatives, I am convinced, can more effectively 
meet their dual responsibility to negotiate and to lead. Only if 
leaders do both can there be constructive labor relationships in place 
85. 29 u.s.c. §§ 176-80 (1964). 
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of the chaos resulting when agreements reached in negotiations are 
rejected by an angry rank and file or defied by subterfuge forms of 
strikes such as working to the rule. 
My suggestions are not put forth with a guaranty that they will 
bring a complete end to public employee srtikes. They will not. 
Rather I suggest that reliance on legal prohibitions, penalties, and 
elaborate third-party recommendations has not worked, and that 
before we turn in desperation to compulsory third-party determina-
tion, which cannot serve as a steady diet, we should give bargaining 
in the public sector the same opportunity it has received, with bene-
ficial results, in the private sector. The most effective technique to 
produce acceptable terms to resolve disputes is voluntary agreement 
of the parties, and the best system we have for producing agreements 
between groups is collective bargaining-even though it involves 
conflict and the possibility of a work disruption. There is no alter-
native. 
